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OPINIONS BELOW 
The summary judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah is unreported, and contained in 
the Transcript of Record. (R. 3 32) 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the Third District Court was entered June 
9, 1987. Notice of Appeal was filed on June 17, 1987 and was 
granted on July 21, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The texts of the following statutes relevant to the 
determination of the present case are set forth in the Appendix: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-41-14 to 31-41-22 (1953 as amended). (The most 
recent changes to these sections are not included since the accident 
and facts involved in this case occurred in 1984 and 1985). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Whether the District Court erred in denying plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment when the undisputed material 
facts revealed that plaintiff should prevail as a matter of law. 
II. In the alternative, whether the District Court erred in 
granting defendants1 motion for summary judgment when there existed 
genuine issues of material fact relating to the issues of effective 
cancellation, receipt of a payment providing coverage, waiver, and 
bad faith and when discovery was incomplete. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 7, 1983, the plaintiff purchased an 
insurance policy from an agent of Farmers Insurance Group, Mid 
Century Insurance Company, and Prematic Service Corporation 
(Farmer's), (R. 1). The insurance policy became effective on 
November 7, 1983 and continued in effect by the payment of monthly 
premiums. (R. 1, 204). Plaintiff's initial payment was twice the 
usual monthly amount so coverage would continue one additional month 
in case of non-payment of a premium. (R. 2 04). The payment record 
shows Farmers accepted a late payment on at least one occasion. 
December's 1984 payment was made and accepted in January with 
January's payment. (R. 2 05) Plaintiff's wife on or about May 15, 
1984 purchased a money order from the post office and sent that 
money order to Farmers Insurance Group in order to pay the May 
premium. (R. 3, 136-139). 
On May 17, 1984, plaintiff was involved in an accident 
with John L. May, an uninsured motorist. (R. 3). Plaintiff applied 
for benefits under his Farmers Insurance policy on June 6, 1984 and 
received benefits under the policy for approximately four months 
following the accident. (R. 121, 123-126). On or about October 18, 
1984, Farmers Insurance Group refused to pay for further lost wages 
and medical expenses, claiming for the first time that plaintiff's 
policy had expired for non-payment of premiums on May 15, 1987. (R. 
128) . After paying benefits for four months and then deciding to 
cancel, Farmer's printed a document showing the expiration date as 
May 15 (R. 178, 327) and threatened legal action against Mr. Godoy 
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if he did not pay back the benefits he had received and that 
Farmer's had paid to health care providers, (R. 128). Farmer's 
refused to pay Mr. Godoy's unpaid medical bills and because Mr. 
Godoy is unable to pay them his credit was and continues to be 
damaged. (R. 128). At the time Farmer's motion was granted, there 
was outstanding written discovery (R. 94) and Farmer's employees had 
not yet been deposed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment. It is a well-established rule in Utah 
that an insurance company waives its rights to claim no coverage 
when its acts and conduct infer coverage. To hold otherwise would 
be to allow an insurance company to benefit from prejudicing an 
insured by inducing the insured to belief that a payment was 
accepted and a decision was made to provide coverage. 
In the alternative, the District Court erred in granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on all issues. There 
existed genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
First, there existed a question of material fact as to 
whether there had been an effective cancellation of the policy since 
the plaintiff received no such cancellation notice until months 
after the accident. Defendants themselves are confused as to when 
the required notice of cancellation was mailed. 
Second, there existed a question as to whether defendants 
received the premium which would have provided coverage at the time 
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of the accident. At this point it is indisputable that plaintiff 
mailed to Farmer's on or about May 15 a premium payment. Farmers in 
not responding to factual allegations has admitted that payment was 
sent. There were outstanding requests for production of documents 
which were objected to by defendants. Those documents may have 
proved the acceptance of the premium payment in question. 
Third, even if payment was not received, there existed an 
issue of material fact as to whether defendants acts and conduct in 
providing coverage constituted a waiver and hence would act to estop 
defendants from claiming non-coverage. 
Fourth, there were genuine issues of material fact as to 
defendants bad faith in not continuing coverage and in threatening 
plaintiff with a lawsuit if benefits were not returned. Because of 
the factual nature of the bad faith issue, plaintiff originally 
moved only for a motion for partial summary judgment rather than a 
motion for summary judgment. 
Fifth, discovery was not complete. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The principals surrounding the issue of waiver in an 
insurance setting have been long established and deeply imbedded in 
Utah decision. Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 3 8 Utah 
532, 114 P. 134, 137 (1911); Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance 
Co. , 91 Utah 405, 64 P.2d 351; Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 146 
P.2d 284, 287 (Utah 1944). 
In the case of Loftis, the insured purchased a life 
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insurance policy• Premium payments were to be deducted directly 
from the insured's earnings. Two timely monthly payments were made 
before the insured defaulted on two subsequent payments. The 
insured was killed during the third insurance period for which the 
premium had not been paid. Id. at 13 6. After the insured's death a 
payment was made which covered the defaulted period. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that since premiums were expected to be paid from 
a payroll deduction and since the insured's pay had fallen below the 
level necessary to make the monthly payments, the insurance company 
had waived its right to claim non-coverage. Id. at 139. The Court 
held them to be a waiver even though the policy itself provided that 
there could be no waiver of the terms of the policy unless in 
writing. Id. at 135. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned: 
That insurance companies may waive prompt 
payment of policies, although such payment is of 
the essence of the contract of insurance and may 
continue and treat policies in force after all. 
rights thereunder had lapsed by reason of a 
provision therein that nonpayment of the premium 
or any part thereof shall cause the policy to 
become void and of no force or effect, is too 
well settled to admit of dispute. 
Id. at 137. (Emphasis added). Additionally, the court cited 2 
Joyce on Insurance § 1356 as well as other treatise as "the over-
whelming weight of authority." Id. at 138: 
If an insurance company or its authorized 
agent, by its habits of business or by its acts 
or declarations, or . . . by any court of 
conduct, has induced an honest belief in the 
mind of the policy holder, which is reasonably 
founded, that strict compliance with the 
stipulation for punctual payment of premiums 
will not be insisted upon, . . . .it will be 
deemed to have waived the right to claim 
forfeiture, or it will be estopped from enforc-
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ing the same although the policy expressly 
provides for forfeiture for nonpayment of 
premiums as stipulated . . . . 
Id. at 138. 
With respect to the insurance companies argument that they 
did not know of the lapse in the policy when they accepted a three 
month old back payment, the Utah Supreme Court, stated, lf!when an 
act of commission or omission is of such a character as to preclude 
the idea of ignorance, knowledge must be presumed. It is difficult 
to perceive how the defendant or its authorized agent could have 
supposed the amount was paid, when neither had received it.1" Id. 
at 140. 
The comparison between the facts in Loftis and the facts 
in the present case is readily apparent. The plaintiff in the 
present case also purchased an insurance policy and began making 
payments as prescribed by the policy. At one point plaintiff mailed 
in a premium which was claimed to not have been received by the in-
surance company. The insurance company treated the policy as if in 
force and paid benefits under the policy. These payments "induced 
an honest belief in the mind of the policy holder," Id. at 138, that 
the policy was in force. Even if the premium mailed on or about May 
15 were argued to be a few days late, Farmers had accepted a payment 
one month late in the past* There was no reason to believe Farmers 
had not accepted this payment. In reliance on that reasonably 
founded belief, the plaintiff did not safeguard his receipts of 
payment of the premium and sought needed medical assistance which he 
could not otherwise have afforded to do. 
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The application of the principle of waiver exists even 
when the policy specifically provides that there will be no waiver 
of any terms of the policy. Loftis at 138; Ellerbeck v. Continen-
tal Casualty Co. , 63 Utah 530, 532, 227 P. 805, 807 (1924); Calhoun 
at 286; Sullivan at 3 60. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
pronounced that a "liberal interpretation" must be given to the acts 
and conduct of a party holding a right of forfeiture: 
Any acts or statements suggesting an 
intention to keep a contract alive are liberally 
construed as a waiver of the right of foreclo-
sure. 
Pollock v. New York Life Insurance Co., 691 F.2d 961, 965 (10th Cir. 
1982), citing, Parker v. California State Life Insurance Co., 85 
Utah 595, 40 P.2d 195, 177 (1935); see Loftis at 140. 
Jurisdictions and authorities other than the Utah Supreme 
Court add additional weight to the proposition that an insurance 
company, by its acts and conduct, may waive certain defenses. 
Couch on Insurance 2d § 71:22 for example states that, "As 
a general rule, acts and conduct of an insurer after a loss has 
occurred which are inconsistent with a particular defense, espe-
cially where the insured has been induced to act, or acts which 
would lull the insured into believing that he is covered, will 
constitute a waiver of the defense." Id. [Footnote citations 
omitted.] 
In the present case, paying benefits under a policy for a 
period of four months was inconsistent with the defense that the 
policy was cancelled because of failure to pay a given premium. 
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Certainly not each time an insurance company makes an inadvertent 
benefit payment would they be required to hold the policy in force. 
But, where the insurance company has adequate time to investigate 
and where an insured has a reasonable expectation of coverage, the 
insurance company should be required to plead defenses only consis-
tent with their acts and conduct over a period of time. 
The Utah Supreme Court has relatively recently supported 
the proposition that an insurance company must diligently inves-
tigate and "act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, the accident occurred on May 17, 1984. (R. 
114). Plaintiff filed for benefits under his policy on June 6, 1984 
(R. 121) . He received benefit payments for four months from the 
time of his accident. (R. 123-126). Farmerfs uses a computer 
system that keeps up-to-date daily information on the status of its 
insureds. (R. 178). The insurance company could have easily met 
the Beck requirement of prompt action and investigation. Rather, it 
paid benefits under the policy, lulled plaintiff into a sense of 
security regarding keeping documentation of premium payments, and 
then four months after the accident claimed no coverage, and refused 
to pay medical bills. This is inconsistent with the spirit and 
letter of Beck. 
Therefore, it is urged that the Supreme Court of Utah in 
keeping with its previous decisions, reverses the District Court and 
instructs the District Court to enter partial summary judgment for 
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plaintiff. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In general, the Utah Supreme Court has held that summary 
judgment is a harsh measure and opposing party's contentions are to 
be considered in a light most favorable to him. W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984). Additionally, 
summary judgment should only be granted when it clearly appears 
there is no reasonable probability the opposing party could prevail. 
Snyder v. Merklev, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984). Under these 
established standards, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants should be reversed. 
A. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether defendants effectively cancelled the 
policy by merely alleging to have timely mailed 
a notice of cancellation, when policy provided 
specific procedures for cancellation. 
It is important to note at the outset of a discussion 
regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy's provisions 
that where there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms of any 
specific policy, they should be construed in favor of the insured 
since he did not draft the documents. Williams v. First Colony 
Life Insurance Co. , 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979). If an insurance 
policy is ambiguous or uncertain in any respect, so that it is 
susceptible to different interpretations, any doubt should be 
resolved in favor of insurance coverage. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. 
v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 731 (Utah 1977); Couch on 
Insurance 2d § 15:83 (citing numerous cases). 
The applicable notice statute in effect at the time of the 
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accident in question requires "ten days notice of cancellation . . . 
." U.C.A. § 31-41-16 (1953). The policy, although somewhat 
ambiguous, requires also ten days notice of cancellation. There-
fore, it becomes crucial to know when the notice of cancellation was 
mailed and when it was received. Even though U.C.A. § 31-41-19 
establishes that proof of mailing is deemed proof of notice, the 
statute does not state when the ten days begins to run. Defendants 
claim notice was mailed sometime after May 1, but are uncertain as 
to the exact date. (R. 187). In various places the defendants 
admit that the notice of cancellation was not mailed until at the 
earliest, May 1, 1984, 17 days prior to the accident. (R. 327). In 
a letter which was produced as part of defendants compliance with 
plaintiff's request for production of documents, an insurance 
representative stated that on May 18, 1984, a bill and final notice 
was sent. (R. 327). If that bill was in fact sent on May 18, 1984, 
the policy would have remained in effect based on the provisions of 
the policy itself, at least until late May or early June. That is 
consistent with the plaintiff's affidavit in which he stated that he 
had received no notice of cancellation until at least a month after 
the accident. 
This is also consistent with Farmer's answer to plain-
tiff's interrogatories wherein it stated that "the precise date of 
mailing is unknown; however, it is the practice of Prematic Service 
Corporation to mail the notice of cancellation—non-payment of 
premium during the first of the month and is believed that this 
notice of cancellation with cancellation 5/15/84 was mailed during 
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the first few days of May." (R. 325). The question of cancellation 
raises two important issues. First, it raises a question as to what 
the policy actually provided in terms of a notice requirement prior 
to cancellation. Second, the time and manner of notice are in 
question. The undated notice that was allegedly mailed to the 
plaintiff provided that the policy would cancel on a specific date 
regardless of when it was mailed or received. (R. 130) . If notice 
of cancellation was sent on or about May 1, then why did Farmer's 
proceed to pay benefits? Mr. Godoy says the notice was mailed much 
later. Was it maiied after Farmer's and its attorney decided to 
cancel the policy later that year? 
Cases have held that issues surrounding the lapse and 
notice of lapse of an insurance policy are material issues of fact 
which are best resolved before a jury. Daugherty v. Wabash Life 
Insurance Co., 482 P.2d 814 (Nev. 1971); Hartsfield v. Carolina 
Casualty Insurance Co., 411 P.2d 396 (1966); Richmeier v. Williams, 
9 Kan. App. 2d 222, 675 P.2d 372 (1984). In Richmeier, although 
adopting a minority rule that notice must actually be received by 
the insured before the policy may validly be cancelled, stated the 
same conclusion that majority jurisdictions follow with respect to 
the notice requirement that "whether the notice was given and 
received is a material question of fact. The question is unre-
solved; therefore summary judgment was not proper.11 Id. at 375. 
In Hartsfield, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that under 
a cancellation clause, even though mailing of notice of cancellation 
to an insured was a prerequisite to effective cancellation of a 
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policy, denial of receipt of notice of cancellation rebutted the 
prima facia case of mailing and created an issue of fact that must 
be resolved by the trier of facts. Hartsfield, 411 P.2d at 397. 
In a like manner, the issue of the effectiveness of 
cancellation of an insurance policy presents an issue of fact that 
must go before the trier of fact. The defendant claims to have 
mailed a timely notice of cancellation, but the plaintiff has 
rebutted this prima facia evidence by claiming that no notice was 
received until well after the accident. 
B. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether the defendants acts constituted a waiver 
of their rights to claim non-coverage. 
In Highlands Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 688 
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1982), the court explained that waiver is usually 
a question of fact to be determined by the jury or, in a bench trial 
by the court. Id. at 4 04. Furthermore, the court explained that: 
Even "slight circumstances" will support a 
finding that an insurer has waived a forfeiture 
clause in an insurance policy. For "courts 
liberally construe in favor of an insured's acts 
or circumstances by the insurer indicating an 
intention to waive a forfeiture." 
Id. This conclusion is supported by Utah case law which states that 
whether a waiver has taken place or not "ordinarily depends upon the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case, and, in most 
instances, presents a question of fact, rather than of law, or at 
least a mixed question of fact and law." Pollock v. New York 
Life Insurance Co., 691 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1982), quoting Loftis, 
114 P. at 139. 
In the present case, the material facts which are in 
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dispute as to whether a waiver occurred are whether by paying 
benefits to the plaintiff over a four month period, an insurance 
company has induced reliance and hence waived its right to later 
claim non-coverage. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether such 
acts by an insurance company would induce a reasonable man to 
believe that insurance coverage would be provided. Mr. Godoy's 
credit was damaged when he was unable to pay his medical bills. In 
reliance upon the insurance company's acts and conduct, Mr. Godoy 
received necessary medical attention which he would not have 
attempted to receive had he not been induced into believing that 
coverage would be provided. Additionally, because coverage was 
provided for such an extended period of time, he failed to safeguard 
his various receipts of premium payments which would have esta-
blished his eligibility for benefits under the policy. 
Because of these factual disputes, which are material to 
the issues of waiver, summary judgment was wrongfully granted in the 
court below in favor of the defendants. 
C. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
. whether the defendant actually received a payment 
providing coverage at the time of the accident. 
A factual dispute relating to the payment or tender of 
premiums is the type of material issue of fact which must be 
resolved by the trier of fact. Daugherty, 482 P.2d at 815. 
Additionally, U.C.A. § 31-41-19 provides that proof of 
mailing is sufficient proof of notice of cancellation. If the 
insurer could allege notice by proof of mailing, then justice would 
also require that the insured could establish coverage by proof of 
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mailing. Thiessens v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review 
of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 663 P.2d 72 (Ut. 1983). (Stating that 
mailing of a letter postage prepaid and properly addressed creates 
an inference that the letter reached its destination.) 
In the present case, the plaintiff and his wife both 
signed affidavits that payment to provide coverage during the 
accident was properly stamped, addressed and mailed to defendants. 
(R. 136, 138-139). According to Thiessens, this creates an infer-
ence that defendants received that payment. As of yet, defendants 
have brought forth no evidence to rebut this presumption. In fact, 
defendants have admitted that payment was made by not denying 
specific paragraphs of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 301, 302). 
Therefore, at a minimum, the issue of payment raises a 
question of fact which must be resolved by a trier of fact. James 
Talcott, Inc. v. Reynolds, 529 P.2d 352, 65 Mont. 404 (1974), 
(stating that when an addressee denies receipt, the question is left 
to a determination by a jury). 
D. There is a question of fact as to bad faith. 
As cited above under Beck v. Farmers, failure to act 
reasonably and promptly in rejecting a claim can constitute bad 
faith. In this case there is at least a question of fact whether 
Farmer's acted reasonably and promptly in rejecting the claim after 
paying benefits for four months. Especially when it printed a 
document after paying benefits showing cancellation was two days 
before the accident and threatened Mr. Godoy with suit if he did not 
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return benefits it had paid even though Farmer's knew that most of 
the benefits had gone to pay for health care providers which 
Farmer's had given Mr. Godoy permission to use. 
E. The District Court erred in granting defendants1 
motion for summary judgment since discovery had 
not yet been completed. 
In the case of Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P. 2d 376 
(Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court held that a grant of summary 
judgment is premature where discovery is not yet complete, since the 
non-moving party claimed that further discovery would provide facts 
sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Also, in 
Cox v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311 the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment by 
denying a party the opportunity to conduct further discovery. 
Likewise, in the present case, there were outstanding dis-
covery requests which would have provided facts sufficient to defeat 
the motion for summary judgment. This was pointed out in Mr. 
Godoy's memorandum opposing summary judgment. (R. 309, 310). 
Plaintiff had requested that defendants produce documents relating 
to the decision to deny coverage. (R. 289) . Defendants objected to 
this request and therefore forced plaintiff to file a motion to 
compel. (R. 288). The documents not produced would have tended to 
show first, whether defendants had received plaintiff's premium 
payment; second, when the defendants knew they were going to deny 
coverage; and three, why the defendants did not provide coverage. 
These facts, if substantiated, could have been used to defeat the 
motion for summary judgment. The District Judge erred in granting 
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summary judgment when there were such outstanding discovery to be 
completed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Third District Court of the State of Utah should be reversed and 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. In the 
alternative, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for 
proceedings on the merits. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CHRISTE/fsEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By 
Jenton M. Hatch 
Attorney for Rudolfo Godoy 
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31-41-14 INSURANCE 
arrest of a person for violation of and See Am. Jur. 2d, No-I 'ault Insurance 
conviction under this act; authorizing po- §§ 1-34, when published, 
litical subdivisions within the state to 
adopt ordinances and regulations consist- Validity and construction of "no-fault" 
ent with this act; and providing an effec- automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. E. 
live date.—L. 1974, ch. 10 3d 229. 
Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial 
Effective Date. Responsibility Act, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1011. 
Section 3 of Laws 1974, ch. 10 provided 
that the act should take effect upon ap- L a w R e v i e w s . 
proval. Approved February 13, 1974. No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
Collateral References. L . Rev. 248. 
Automobi les®^. Compensation Svstems and Utah's No-
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §2." Fault Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 606, Aurornn..: ; Countrywide Overview of Automobile 
Highway Traffic § 13. No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443 
(1974). 
ARTICLE 2 
CANCELLATION OF POLICIES 
Section 31-41-14, Definition of terms. 
31-41-15. Notice of cancellation of policy—Requirements for validity—Ex-
ceptions. 
31-41-16. Notice of cancellation of policy—Time for mailing or delivery—Be-
quest for reason for cancellation—Exception. 
31-41-17. Nonrenewal of policy—-Time limit for mailing or delivery of notice 
of intention—Exceptions—Termination on effective date of other 
insurance—Renewal not waiver of grounds for cancellation—Re-
quest for reason for nonrenewal. 
31-41-18. Discriminatory practices in cancellation or nonrenewal prohibited. 
31-41-19. Proof of mailing deemed proof of notice. 
31-41-20. Cancellation or nonrenewal of bodily injury and property damage 
liability coverage—Notice to insured of assigned risk plan. 
31-41 2L Commissioner or insurer absolved from liability for notice pertain-
• ing to cancellation or nonrenewal. 
'ii 41 '-'i Policies not covered by act. 
31-4144. Definition of terms.—As used in this act: 
(1) "Policy" means an automobile insurance policy providing coverage 
for any or all of the following coverages: Collision, comprehensive, bodily 
injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, and un-
insured motorist coverage, or any combination of them delivered or issue 1 
for delivery in this state, insuring a single individual, husband and wi;V 
or family members residing in the same household, as the named insureds. 
The insured vehicles designated in the policy must be of the following 
types: 
(a) All motor vehicles of the two or four door sedan type, including 
station wagons and sports cars, that are not used to transport goods or 
persons for hire in the regular course of business.; or 
(b) Any other four-wheel motor vehicle with a load capacity of 9,000 
pounds or less which is not used in the occupation, profession, or business 
of the insured. 
(2) "Renewal" or "to renew" means the issuance and delivery by an 
insurer of a policy replacing at the end of the policy period a policy 
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previously issued and delivered by the same insurer, or the issuance and 
delivery of a certificate or notice extending the term of the policy beyond 
its policy period or term; but any policy with a policy period or term of 
less than twelve months shall for the purpose of this act be considered as 
if written for a policy period or term of twelve months; and any policy 
written for a term longer than one year, or any policy with no fixed ex-
piration date, shall, for the purposes of this act, be considered as if 
written for successive policy periods or terms of one year, and such policy 
may be terminated at the expiration of any annual period upon giving 
thirty days' notice of nonrenewal prior to such anniversary date, and 
such nonrenewal shall not be subject to any other provisions of this act. 
(3) "Nonpayment of premium" means failure of the named insured 
to discharge when due any of his obligations in connection with the pay-
ment of premiums on the policy, or any installment of such premium, 
whether the premium is payable directly to the insurer or its agent, or in-
directly under any premium finance plan or extension of credit, or in con-
nection with the payment of any membership fees or dues to an association 
or organization, other than an insurance association or organization, where 
the payment of such fees or dues is a prerequisite to obtaining or eontinu 
ing insurance in force. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 1. the insurance commissioner and insurer 
from liability arising out of any cancella-
Title ol Act, tion; exempting policies written under the 
An act relating to the cancellation of assignment of risk provisions of section 
automobile insurance policies; providing 41-12-35; and providing an effective date. 
certain conditions under which the in- —L. 1973, ch. 00. 
surer may cancel the policy or fail to 
renew it after proper and timely notice Cross-Reference. 
has been served on the insured; absolving Automobile liabilitv i*-.;. •• i. *) • ""• 
31-41-15, Notice of cancellation of policy—Requiiemeiits for validity •-
Exceptions.—(1) A notice of cancellation of a policy shall he valid only 
if it is based on one or more of the following reasons : 
fa) Nonpayment of premium; or 
(b) The driver's license or motor vehicle registration of either the 
named insured or any operator who customarily operates an automobile 
insured under the policy has been under suspension or revocation during 
the policy period, or if the policy is a renewal, during its policy period or 
the ISO days immediately preceding its effective date; or 
(c) The applicant knowingly made a false statement on the application 
for insurance, 
(2) This section does not apply M-.
 tl:i> pnt;^. or coverage which has 
been in effect less than sixty days at the time notice of cancellation is 
mailed or delivered by the insurer, unless it is a renewal policy 
(3) This section does not apply to the nonrenewal of a policy. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, §2, Cancellation of compulsory or "financial 
, _ . responsibility" automobile insurance, 171 
Collateral References.
 A L> R< 550^ 3 4 A # L # R . 2d 1297. 
Iiisurance<3=>228(l). Insurance agent's statement or conduct 
4," C.J.S. Insurance § 450. indicating that insurer's cancellation of 
4;) Am. Jur. 2d 444, Insurance §399. policy shall not take effect as binding on 
insurer, 3 A. L, R. 3d 1135. 
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Liability of insurer, under compulsory by limits of Financial Responsibility Act, 
statutory vehicle liability policy, to in- 29 A. L. E. 2d 817. 
jured third persons, notwithstanding in- Remedies and measure of damages for 
aured's failure to comply with policy con- wrongful cancellation of liability and 
ditions, as measured by policy limits or property insurance, 34 A. L, E. 3d 385. 
31-41-16. Notice of cancellation of policy—Time for mailing or delivery 
—Request for reason for cancellation—Exception.—(1) No notice of can-
cellation, of a policy to which section 31-41-15 applies shall be valid unless 
mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least twenty 
days prior to the effective date of cancellation. Where cancellation is for 
nonpayment of premium,, at least ten days' notice of cancellation accom-
panied by the reason therefor must be given. 
(2) Where the reason for cancellation is not included with the notice 
of cancellation, the insurer, upon written request of the named insured 
mailed or delivered to the insurer not less than fifteen days prior to the 
effective date of cancellation shall specify in writing the reason for such 
cancellation, which reasons shall be mailed or delivered to the named in-
sured within five days after receipt of request. 
(3) This section does not apply to the nonrenewal of a policy. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 3. 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 450. 
43 Am. Jur. 2d 450, Insurance § 405, 
Collateral References, 
Insurance<§=>229(l). 
31-41-17. Nonrenewal of policy—Time limit for mailing or delivery of 
notice of intention—Exceptions—Termination on effective date of other in-
surance—Renewal not waiver of grounds for cancellation—Request for 
reason for nonrenewal.— (1) No insurer shall refuse to renew a policy 
unless this insurer or its agent shall mail or deliver to the named insured, 
at the address shown in the policy, at least thirty days' advance notice of 
its intention not to renew. This section shall not apply : 
(a) Where the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew, 
(b) Where there has been nonpayment of premium. 
(c) Where the insured fails to pay any advance premium,, required 
by the insurer for renewal. 
(2) Notwithstanding the failure of an insurer to lomply \\w. * bis 
section, the policy shall terminate on the effecini; dme of any other insur-
ance policy covering the same automobile. 
(3) Renewal of a policy shall not constitute a waiver or estoppel with 
respect to grounds for cancellation which existed prior to the effective 
date of the renewal. 
(4) In the event an Insurer refuses to renew, the insured by written 
request may demand a written notification of the reason or reasons for 
nonrenewal. Notification must be given the insured within twenty days after 
receipt of such request. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § L Provision of policy for mailing of notice 
to insured's address as stated therein, as 
Collateral References. affected by change of address, 63 A. L. R. 
Insurance€=>145(4). 2d 570. 
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 283. 
43 Am, Jur . 2d 427, Insurance § 379, 
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31-41-18. Discriminatory practices in cancellation or nonrenewal pro-
hibited.—No insurer shall cancel or refuse to renew a policy of automobile 
insurance on any person with at least two years' driving experience solely 
because of the age, residence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry or 
lawful occupation (including the military service) of anyone who is in-
sured or solely because another insurer has refused to write a policy, or has 
canceled or has refused to renew an existing policy in, which that person 
was the named insured. 
History: L. 1973, cli. 56, § 5. Collateral Keferences. 
- _ - Insurance<S=»4. 
Cross-Reference.
 4 4 CJ^ I n 8 u r a n c e § 59< 
Unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 43 Am, Jur, 2d 108, insurance § 52. 
31-27-1 et seq. 
31-41-19. Proof of mailing deemed proof of notice,—Proof of mailing 
to the named insured at the address shown on the policy of the notice of 
cancellation, the intention not to renew, or of reasons for cancellation shall 
be sufficient proof of the notice. 
History: L. 1973s ch. 56, §6. tice to insured's address as stated therein, 
as affected by change of address, 63 A. L. 
Collateral References, j ^ 2d 570, 
Provision, of policy for mailing of no-
31-41-20, Cancellation or nonrenewal of bodily injury and property 
damage liability coverage—Notice to insured of assigned risk plan.—When 
bodily injury and property damage liability coverage is canceled other 
than for nonpayment of premium, or in the event of failure to renew the 
bodily injury and property damage liability coverage in which section 
31-41-17 applies, the insurer shall notify the named insured of his possible 
eligibility for automobile liability insurance through the assigned risk plan 
set forth in section 41-12-35 and where he may obtain information concern-
ing such plan. This information shall accompany or be included in the 
notice of cancellation or the notice of intent not to renew. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 7. 
31-41-21. Commissioner oi m^m1 aty for notice per-
taining to cancellation or nonrenew., • - . -io liability on the 
part of the commissioner of insurance or any insurer, its authorized agents, 
or representatives, or any person, firm, or corporation furnishing to the in-
surer any notice or information pertaining to cancellation or nonrenewal of 
any policy. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 8. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 464, 
, " 63 Am. Jur. 2d 810, Public Officers and 
Collateral References. Employees § 304. 
Constitution;]! L«iw<S=>70(l)p. 
31-41-22. Policies not covered by act.—Tins act shall not apply to any 
policy issued under an assigned risk plan set forth in section 41-12-35 or 
to any policy insuring more than four automobiles, or to any policy cover-
ing garage, automobile sales agency, repair shop, service station, or public 
parking place operation hazard, or to any policy of insurance issued princi-
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pally to cover the preiuises of an insured even though such insurance may 
also provide some incidental coverage for liability arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles on the premises of such insured, 
or on the ways immediately adjoining such premises. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, §9. vided: "This act shall take effect; on 
January 1, 1974, and shall apply to poli-
Effective Date, , . } e s -written or renewed on or after that 
Section 10 of Laws 1973, ch. 56 pro- date," 
CHAPTER 42 
HEALTH MA1NTK\AN< !•] ORGANIZATIONS 
Section 31-42-1. Pita lion of act. 
31-42-2. Declaration of public policy. 
31-42-3. Definition of terms. 
31-42-4. Certificate of authority required for health maintenance organization. 
31-42-5. Application for certificate—Filing—Supporting documents. 
31-42-6. Application and documents transmitted to director of division of 
health—Determinations and certification by director—Determina-
tions and procedure for issuance or denial of certificate by com-
missioner. 
Revocation of certificate—Grounds. 
Administrative penalty in lieu of revocation of certificate. 
Commissioner's assistance to organizations. 
Powers of organizations—'Health care professionals. 
Procedure for participation by members and for resolving corn 
plaints by members or providers. 
Contracts between organization and members—Disclosure of bene-
fits. 
Discrimination in transfer of contract from group to individual 
basis and rate prohibited—Grounds for cancellation of contract— 
Underwriting classifications and experience rating au thor i zed -
Annual enrollment of members. 
31-42-14. Annual report by organization to commissioner and director. 
31-42-15. Examination of organization and providers. 
31-42-16. Annual audit of organization's internal quality control. 
31-42-17. Untrue or misleading solicitation and contractual materials pro-
hibited—-Advertising names or qualifications of employees or 
providers prohibited—Filing of promotional materials—Applica-
tion of unfair trade practices laws. 
31-42-18. Applications, reports and records as matters of public record— 
Financial materials excepted. 
31-42-19. Reimbursement by member of benefits under governmental or 
private health care plans. 
31-42-20. Licensing of agents. 
31-42-21. Restrictions on cancellation, or nonrenewal of membership. 
31-42-22. Words descriptive of insurance prohil dted in titles or promotional 
material. 
31-42-23. Bonding of organization personnel. 
31-42-24. Rules and regulations of commissioner and board of health. 
31-42-25. Health maintenance organization advisory council—Members—Ap-
po in tmen t—Terms— Vacancies — Chairman and vice-chairman—• 
Meetings—Quorum-—Expenses—Duties. 
31-42-26. Notice of action, to revoke certificate or levy pena l ty—Hear ing-
Judicial review. 
31-42-27, Action for injunctive relief. 
31-42-28. Fees. 
31-42-29. Violation—Misdemeanor. 
31-42-30. Director's contracts for recommendations, investigations, examina-
tions and surveys. 
31-42-31. Application of Insurance Code and Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions Act. 
31-42-32, State employees' enrollment in organization authorized. 
31-42-7. 
31-42-8. 
31-42-9. 
31-42-10. 
31-42-11. 
31-42-12. 
31-42-13. 
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